Zanu-PF recalls President – Cde Mnangagwa takes over as Party’s First Secretary

President Mugabe

President Mugabe

Tendai Mugabe, Harare Bureau
ZANU-PF yesterday recalled President Mugabe from the position of party First Secretary and replaced him with former Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa whom the ruling party also reinstated as Central Committee member.

Cde Mnangagwa’s election as the Zanu-PF President and First Secretary would be ratified at the Extra Ordinary Congress slated for next month. The party also said that President Mugabe must resign as State President by mid-day today failure of which the party’s chief whip Cde Lovemore Matuke would institute impeachment proceedings in line with Section 97 of the national Constitution.

Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa

Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa

The party also expelled several members for various charges including Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko and Dr Grace Mugabe, who was the secretary for Women Affairs. The decisions were made during a special Central Committee meeting held at the party’s headquarters yesterday. The Central Committee is Zanu-PF’s highest decision making organ outside Congress and yesterday’s meeting was attended by 201 members out of 300 members.

Reading out the resolutions of the meeting yesterday, Zanu-PF secretary for legal affairs Cde Patrick Chinamasa said:

“The first resolution was that the Central Committee on behalf of Zanu-PF expressed profound gratitude to the Zimbabwe Defence Forces for their intervention efforts in the internal affairs of the party as the governing party with a view of bringing normalcy both in the party and Government. The Central Committee congratulated the masses of Zimbabwe for their participation in the historic solidarity march yesterday in support of the Zimbabwe War Veterans Association. The Central Committee also passed the following resolutions – that the unconstitutional removal of Cde Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa as Vice President and Second Secretary of Zanu-PF and his expulsion from the party be and is hereby nullified forthwith. The resolution also goes to restore him to his position as a member of the Central Committee.

Dr Grace Mugabe

Dr Grace Mugabe

“There were recommendations made by the provincial coordinating committees suspending and expelling members from the party, the resolution is that these suspensions and expulsions be and are hereby nullified. Further, that all members of Central Committee who were elected at the 2014 Congress and who were subsequently suspended or expelled from the party subsequent to the Congress on the basis of fictitious or fabricated allegations by the G40 cabal for protection of criminals be and are hereby reinstated.

 Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko

Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko

“Further resolution is that members from the lower organs of the party that is provincial, district, branch councils who were suspended or expelled from the party subsequent to the 2014 Congress be and are hereby reinstated forthwith to the positions they held.

“That Cde R.G Mugabe be and he is hereby recalled from the position of President and First Secretary of Zanu-PF forthwith. Further, the resolutions that Cde R.G Mugabe should resign forthwith from his position as President and Head of State and Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe and if the resignation has not been tendered by mid day tomorrow 20 November 2017 (today), the Zanu-PF chief (Cde Lovemore Matuke) is ordered to institute proceedings for the recall of the President in terms of Section 97 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

Prof Moyo

Prof Moyo

“That Cde Phelekezela Mphoko be and is hereby recalled from the position of Vice President and Second Secretary of Zanu-PF for being divisive, a member of the cabal, protecting criminals, preaching hate speech and behaving in a manner inconsistent with the Office and decorum of the Office.”

Cde Chinamasa continued: “That members of the cabal namely Cde Mphoko, (Saviour) Kasukuwere, Jonathan Moyo, Ignatius Chombo, Patrick Zhuwao, Letina Undenge, Grace Mugabe, Kudzanai Chipanga, Walter Mzembi, Paul Chimedza, Makhosini Hlongwane, Anastancia Ndlovu, Mandi Chimene, Dr Samuel Undenge, Sarah Mahoka, Mpehlabayo Malinga, Xavier Kazizi, Tongai Kasukuwere and Innocent Hamandishe, Eunice Sandi Moyo and Shadreck Mashayamombe be expelled from the party.

Cde Kasukuwere

Cde Kasukuwere

“That Grace Mugabe be and is hereby recalled from the position of secretary for Women’s League of Zanu-PF for promoting hate speech, divisiveness and assuming roles and powers not delegated to her office. That Cde ED Mnangagwa be and is hereby appointed as interim President and First Secretary of Zanu-PF pending ratification by the Extra Ordinary Congress scheduled for the 12th to the 17th of December 2017.

“That Cde ED Mnangagwa be the party’s nominee to be appointed to fill the vacancy of State President in terms of Part 4, paragraph 14 sub paragraph 5 of the Sixth schedule of Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment number 20.

Cde Patrick Zhuwao

Cde Patrick Zhuwao

“That the Extra-ordinary Congress scheduled for 12th to the 17th of December 2017 should proceed for purposes of ratifying the decisions we have taken this afternoon in particular ratifying the appointment of Cde ED Mnangagwa as the First Secretary and President of Zanu-PF. The Extra Ordinary Congress should also ratify the decision we have taken today to recall Cde R.G Mugabe as President and First Secretary of Zanu-PF.”

Cde Chinamasa said some of the resolutions touched on amendments of the constitution to remove the clause of one centre of power and restoration of the District Coordinating Committees.

He said it was agreed that war veterans should be appointed in strategic positions both in the party and Government as long as they had requisite qualifications.

Cde Chinamasa said the Central Committee resolved to fill the position of national chairman that had been vacant for four years.

Zanu-PF secretary for information Cde Simon Khaya Moyo said the meeting also resolved that Cde Mnangagwa should be the party’s Presidential candidate for next year’s harmonised elections.

He said it was also agreed that the Politburo should revert to its subordinate role of being the secretariat of the Central Committee.

Said Cde Khaya Moyo: “Cde R.G Mugabe was removed from the position of President and First Secretary of Zanu-PF by a unanimous vote.”

Secretary for finance Cde Obert Mpofu, who chaired the meeting, said it was unfortunate that President Mugabe was leaving in a sad manner.

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  • Ton van Der Parker

    What about that youth leader who organised the president’s farewell parties?

  • General Tongo

    It seems as if another dictator is on the horizon . l foresee a very vindictive spell following with lots of purges and the masses being neglected once more. We have been used again , or Lord help us.

  • Msongelwa

    Advance Generals no retreat until the enermy is defeated, glad to hear that all party regalia and all blazers with Mgabe’s face will be burnt and I wish also to immediately remove his name on our streets, roads and airport because he belongs to dustbin of history, even if he goes on hunger strike let him continue as he had eaten enough to sustain,Zimbabweans are being called all sort of names and exploitation is the order of the day in foreign countries because one man called Mugabe.

    • Oginy’zapu uginye utshefu

      Msongelwa lalela ke lapha mfana, umgabe ukuze abeyinyamazana wenziwa yibo omnakaka labo chiwenka abathi umgabe kabuyele esikhundleni bazammela nxa abantu bangangena ezitaladeni befuna uTswankilai ukuthi abuse njengoba enqobile batsho njalo bakugcizelele ukuthi umkhokheli waleli;izwe kufanele abe lamawar credentials.

  • qondani

    It’s over for this family

  • s

    can a snake kill itself? never!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. today zanu will be backing off from impeachment. mark my words. when we were marching on Saturday, they were singing zanu while the people were singing Zimbabwe. as long as they don’t know the difference between zanu and government mugabe will win this battle. to chiwenga and mnangagwa, when you have to kill a snake crush its head not the body. hitting its body and play with it while the head is not crushed is dangerous. to you two this snake is not dead and will bite you soon. mark my words. mugabe is the most dangerous snake you cant keep holding/playing with even when you have hit its body. ask Tsvangirai.

  • Vumani

    Transfering power to gukurahundist renouned tribalist who is clouded in Maoist ideology there will suppression of freedom of speech & repressive laws mark my words if you think Mugabe was divisive then you will see why this guy supervised the killing of 20 000 unarmed civilians & remains unapologetic & unremorsful.

    • Simon

      How many Mthwakazi people have killed each other through stabbing each other with Okapis since 1980, at least 100 000, so what are you saying

      • Simon

        How many Shonas have disappeared never to be found? Maybe you guys eat each other?

    • Mthwakazi

      How come your own Mthwakazi son Obert Mpofu is singing praise to him? Who is likely to be believed you or Obert Mpofu?

      Stop wasting your time you’re nothing you’re worth less that your mom’s faeces.

  • khokho

    it is not right to remove a democratically elected government, we need elections , prevent suffering in the long run, those who seize power might not be able to pay civil service salaries and other essentials as they would be cut out by serious sanctions, and instead of dealing with such they might be forced to resort to a genocide. Elections are the right way forward not by the barrel of a gun

    • cf stodd

      Zimbabwe’s Economic and Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) supported by the World Bank dismantled many of the controls confining the country’s economy. Implemented during a severe recession brought on by Zimbabwe’s worst drought in more than a century, the program made impressive strides in trade and domestic regulatory policy, creating the basis for self-sustaining growth. But according to OED’s recent audit,1/ the program did not reduce poverty and unemployment as its architects had hoped. Critical fiscal reforms made slow and uncertain progress, keeping budget deficits high. This created uncertainty and shortages of capital for private producers, which delayed investment in new capacity and job creation. By focusing on the formal urban sector, the program restricted its ability to reach the majority of Zimbabweans, who work predominantly in the informal sector and in rural areas. Two basic lessons are that: (1) macroeconomic stabilization–particularly fiscal adjustment–is a prerequisite for sustainable growth in employment, output, and incomes, and (2) sound macroeconomic policies need to be accompanied by actions specifically designed to assist and protect people who do not directly benefit from formal sector growth. Zimbabwe’s ongoing Poverty Alleviation Action Plan incorporates many of the lessons drawn from the first phase of the ESAP.

      Background

      To reduce Zimbabwe’s deep socioeconomic disparities, the government that came to power at independence in 1980 invested heavily in health and education and, through parastatals, in rural development and the productive sectors. This led to an increase in public expenditures, which for most of the 1980s made up 45 percent of the GDP.

      Although social indicators improved, particularly in health and education, per capita income stagnated. Large government spending crowded out private investment and fueled inflation, while shortages of imported goods constrained investment and growth. Population grew faster than job creation, widening the disparities in income levels. In 1991, the government proposed a policy agenda that formed the basis for the Economic and Structural Adjustment Program. The World Bank supported the ESAP with a $125 million structural adjustment loan (SAL) and a $50 million structural adjustment credit (SAC), both approved in 1992 and closed in 1993.

      Goals

      The ESAP sought to transform Zimbabwe’s tightly controlled economic system to a more open, market-driven economy. The restructuring sought to promote higher growth and to reduce poverty and unemployment by (1) reducing fiscal and parastatal deficits and instituting prudent monetary policy; (2) liberalizing trade policies and the foreign exchange system; (3) carrying out domestic deregulation; and (4) establishing social safety net and training programs for vulnerable groups. The focus was on the formal sector as the engine of growth.

      Implementation and outcome

      A severe drought in 1992 left Zimbabwe in its worst recession since independence. Despite the drought the government continued the reforms, making considerable progress in trade liberalization and domestic deregulation. It dismantled the foreign exchange control system, freed all current account transactions from exchange controls and import licensing, removed public monopoly over the marketing of agricultural commodities, deregulated the financial sector, lifted price controls, and abolished investment licensing for all but large foreign investments. By dismantling many of the economic controls, the reforms established a better basis for selfsustaining growth.

      Structural changes brought on by the reforms resulted in improvements. The manufacturing sector achieved positive growth in 1994, and its exports increased. Agriculture showed signs of recovery. Freeing the maize market in particular benefited the urban poor, both nutritionally and economically. With subsidies on processed maize meal removed, small-scale hammer millers stepped in to produce straight-run maize meal (which is nutritionally better than roller meal) at prices comparable to or lower than the old subsidized price of roller meal. Finally, the availability and quality of urban transport improved. But the program’s success in economic liberalization was not matched in the implementation of fiscal reforms and social welfare programs.

      Fiscal reforms

      The fiscal reforms hinged on reducing the size of the civil service and subsidies to parastatals. Although the government reduced spending significantly, from 46 to 39 percent of GDP between 1989 and 1994, the cuts did not go far enough. The civil service wage and salary bill remained high, and the slow pace of parastatal reform contributed to government deficits, leading to excessive monetary growth, inflation, and high interest rates, crowding out the private sector from access to domestic savings. On the revenue side, a decrease in the marginal tax rates for individuals and corporations lowered tax revenues. Coupled with the high costs of drought relief, these trends kept the deficit high. The climate of uncertainty that ensued delayed the supply response and contributed to a worsening of living conditions for the poor.

      Social dimensions

      The program’s social dimensions of adjustment (SDA) component was to address the transitional hardships brought on by the proposed civil service downsizing, the removal of maize meal subsidy to poor urban consumers, and the reinforcement or introduction of health and education fees. It centered around a social development fund with two parts: (1) a social safety net, which provided support for food expenses and school examination and health fees; and (2) an employment and training program for those affected by the downsizing.

      The SDA suffered from many problems. Insufficient prior analytical work led to poor targeting of beneficiaries and inaccurate assessment of their numbers and where they lived, leading to an urban bias. The program was slow in getting started. After announcing the SDA component in 1991, the government took 18 months to appoint a coordinator (the drought took much of the government’s attention during part of the program). SDA was underfunded, overly centralized, and relied on overworked staff already fully committed to the drought relief effort. It suffered from serious design flaws. It relied on beneficiaries to apply for benefits, and the complicated and costly application process effectively excluded many of the poorest people, who had little access to government information. The program’s fee support system was complex, involving different eligibility criteria and arbitrary income thresholds. Finally, its training component for retrenched workers was too short and not always relevant to needs.

      The government has since addressed these shortcomings in its new Poverty Alleviation Action Plan. The guiding principle of the new plan is decentralized decisionmaking, with project needs to be identified at the village level and approved at the district level.

      Lessons

      Zimbabwe’s experience provides two important lessons for other highly dualistic economies undergoing major reforms, among them the need for:

      - Macroeconomic stabilization, particularly tighter fiscal policy, which requires sustained reduction of public expenditures through faster privatization of parastatals and civil service downsizing. The latter also requires integrating retrenchment initiatives and strategic planning to ensure efficiency gains.

      - Careful targeting of social programs. Zimbabwe’s experience highlights the inherent difficulties in targeting social programs to reach the poor. It shows the importance of avoiding an urban bias, of devising simple eligibility criteria for social safety net beneficiaries, of devolving initiatives to the community level, and of engaging a wide range of interested parties, including disadvantaged groups and community leaders, in partnership.

      1/ Performance audit report, “Zimbabwe–Structural Adjustment Program,” Report No. 14751, June 1995. Performance audit reports are available to Bank executive directors and staff from the Internal Documents Unit and from Regional Information Service Centers.

  • cf stodd

    Zimbabwe’s Economic and Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) supported by the World Bank dismantled many of the controls confining the country’s economy. Implemented during a severe recession brought on by Zimbabwe’s worst drought in more than a century, the program made impressive strides in trade and domestic regulatory policy, creating the basis for self-sustaining growth. But according to OED’s recent audit,1/ the program did not reduce poverty and unemployment as its architects had hoped. Critical fiscal reforms made slow and uncertain progress, keeping budget deficits high. This created uncertainty and shortages of capital for private producers, which delayed investment in new capacity and job creation. By focusing on the formal urban sector, the program restricted its ability to reach the majority of Zimbabweans, who work predominantly in the informal sector and in rural areas. Two basic lessons are that: (1) macroeconomic stabilization–particularly fiscal adjustment–is a prerequisite for sustainable growth in employment, output, and incomes, and (2) sound macroeconomic policies need to be accompanied by actions specifically designed to assist and protect people who do not directly benefit from formal sector growth. Zimbabwe’s ongoing Poverty Alleviation Action Plan incorporates many of the lessons drawn from the first phase of the ESAP.

    Background

    To reduce Zimbabwe’s deep socioeconomic disparities, the government that came to power at independence in 1980 invested heavily in health and education and, through parastatals, in rural development and the productive sectors. This led to an increase in public expenditures, which for most of the 1980s made up 45 percent of the GDP.

    Although social indicators improved, particularly in health and education, per capita income stagnated. Large government spending crowded out private investment and fueled inflation, while shortages of imported goods constrained investment and growth. Population grew faster than job creation, widening the disparities in income levels. In 1991, the government proposed a policy agenda that formed the basis for the Economic and Structural Adjustment Program. The World Bank supported the ESAP with a $125 million structural adjustment loan (SAL) and a $50 million structural adjustment credit (SAC), both approved in 1992 and closed in 1993.

    Goals

    The ESAP sought to transform Zimbabwe’s tightly controlled economic system to a more open, market-driven economy. The restructuring sought to promote higher growth and to reduce poverty and unemployment by (1) reducing fiscal and parastatal deficits and instituting prudent monetary policy; (2) liberalizing trade policies and the foreign exchange system; (3) carrying out domestic deregulation; and (4) establishing social safety net and training programs for vulnerable groups. The focus was on the formal sector as the engine of growth.

    Implementation and outcome

    A severe drought in 1992 left Zimbabwe in its worst recession since independence. Despite the drought the government continued the reforms, making considerable progress in trade liberalization and domestic deregulation. It dismantled the foreign exchange control system, freed all current account transactions from exchange controls and import licensing, removed public monopoly over the marketing of agricultural commodities, deregulated the financial sector, lifted price controls, and abolished investment licensing for all but large foreign investments. By dismantling many of the economic controls, the reforms established a better basis for selfsustaining growth.

    Structural changes brought on by the reforms resulted in improvements. The manufacturing sector achieved positive growth in 1994, and its exports increased. Agriculture showed signs of recovery. Freeing the maize market in particular benefited the urban poor, both nutritionally and economically. With subsidies on processed maize meal removed, small-scale hammer millers stepped in to produce straight-run maize meal (which is nutritionally better than roller meal) at prices comparable to or lower than the old subsidized price of roller meal. Finally, the availability and quality of urban transport improved. But the program’s success in economic liberalization was not matched in the implementation of fiscal reforms and social welfare programs.

    Fiscal reforms

    The fiscal reforms hinged on reducing the size of the civil service and subsidies to parastatals. Although the government reduced spending significantly, from 46 to 39 percent of GDP between 1989 and 1994, the cuts did not go far enough. The civil service wage and salary bill remained high, and the slow pace of parastatal reform contributed to government deficits, leading to excessive monetary growth, inflation, and high interest rates, crowding out the private sector from access to domestic savings. On the revenue side, a decrease in the marginal tax rates for individuals and corporations lowered tax revenues. Coupled with the high costs of drought relief, these trends kept the deficit high. The climate of uncertainty that ensued delayed the supply response and contributed to a worsening of living conditions for the poor.

    Social dimensions

    The program’s social dimensions of adjustment (SDA) component was to address the transitional hardships brought on by the proposed civil service downsizing, the removal of maize meal subsidy to poor urban consumers, and the reinforcement or introduction of health and education fees. It centered around a social development fund with two parts: (1) a social safety net, which provided support for food expenses and school examination and health fees; and (2) an employment and training program for those affected by the downsizing.

    The SDA suffered from many problems. Insufficient prior analytical work led to poor targeting of beneficiaries and inaccurate assessment of their numbers and where they lived, leading to an urban bias. The program was slow in getting started. After announcing the SDA component in 1991, the government took 18 months to appoint a coordinator (the drought took much of the government’s attention during part of the program). SDA was underfunded, overly centralized, and relied on overworked staff already fully committed to the drought relief effort. It suffered from serious design flaws. It relied on beneficiaries to apply for benefits, and the complicated and costly application process effectively excluded many of the poorest people, who had little access to government information. The program’s fee support system was complex, involving different eligibility criteria and arbitrary income thresholds. Finally, its training component for retrenched workers was too short and not always relevant to needs.

    The government has since addressed these shortcomings in its new Poverty Alleviation Action Plan. The guiding principle of the new plan is decentralized decisionmaking, with project needs to be identified at the village level and approved at the district level.

    Lessons

    Zimbabwe’s experience provides two important lessons for other highly dualistic economies undergoing major reforms, among them the need for:

    - Macroeconomic stabilization, particularly tighter fiscal policy, which requires sustained reduction of public expenditures through faster privatization of parastatals and civil service downsizing. The latter also requires integrating retrenchment initiatives and strategic planning to ensure efficiency gains.

    - Careful targeting of social programs. Zimbabwe’s experience highlights the inherent difficulties in targeting social programs to reach the poor. It shows the importance of avoiding an urban bias, of devising simple eligibility criteria for social safety net beneficiaries, of devolving initiatives to the community level, and of engaging a wide range of interested parties, including disadvantaged groups and community leaders, in partnership.

    1/ Performance audit report, “Zimbabwe–Structural Adjustment Program,” Report No. 14751, June 1995. Performance audit reports are available to Bank executive directors and staff from the Internal Documents Unit and from Regional Information Service Centers.

    lest you forget the world bank 1990 imposition of esap

  • Ndlovu

    Change is welcome, also get rid of this ‘Cde’ title. reminds me of old Mobutu in Zaire
    insisting everybody be called Citizen. Communism is finished and on the dust heap of
    history. Zimbabwe the future is yours.

  • entabeni

    there is a story in the bible where people cried for a leader and God gave them Saul they were so happy they couldnt wait for God to choose someone at his pace but insisted they wanted a leader untill Saul was appointed he was only good for just a short time untill he showed them his true colours there was some suffering in the land

  • nsingo

    why do the Generals want that man as their choice when the constitution allows anyone above the age of forty to contest for that seat, they are supposed to be apolitical